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[T]he Court for all time has validated the principle of racial dis-
crimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting Ameri-
can citizens.  The principle lies about like a loaded weapon ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible 
claim of an urgent need.  
Justice Jackson, dissenting 
Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
Ahmed’s Secret Incarceration
What do you make of Nasser Ahmed’s secret incarceration?  An 
imagined Kafkaesque trial of the absurd?  Could it be real, here in 
the United States?
Nasser Ahmed spends over three years in prison as a na-
tional security threat.  “Secret evidence” in a “secret” government 
proceeding marks him a bona fide threat to the nation’s security. 
An Egyptian father of four U.S. citizen children, Ahmed is never 
charged with a crime.  Even so, the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service imprisons and then seeks to deport him based on evi-
dence hidden from Ahmed and his attorney.  For an entire year, 
the government refuses to even furnish Ahmed’s lawyer with a 
summary of the evidence.  Finally, the government provides a 
one-line summary, asserting only that it has evidence “concerning 
respondent’s association with a known terrorist organization.” 
The government refuses to identify the organization.1   Unable to 
defend himself against nonexistent charges on the basis of undis-
closed evidence in a secret proceeding, Ahmed languishes in soli-
tary confinement.
After years of incarceration the actual “secret” evidence is re-
vealed, and it shows that Ahmed has not engaged in any kind of 
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terrorist activity.  Nor has he supported any terrorist organiza-
tions.  The government imprisoned and sought to deport Ahmed 
on national security grounds because of his “associations.”  And 
what were the government’s allegations of those associations? 
Ahmed once was appointed by a U.S. court to serve as a paralegal 
and translator for the defense team of Sheik Abdel Rahman, who 
was being tried in a U.S. court for seditious conspiracy.  Three 
years of secret incarceration for doing what the court asked and 
indeed authorized him to do. 
Ahmed’s civil liberties nightmare sounds like tortured Kaf-
ka-esque imaginings.  It is, however, reality.  United States real-
ity.  One such story among many.  And it happened during time 
of comparative peace, well before the public outcry for revenge 
abroad and heightened national security protections at home fol-
lowing the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon.  A board of immigration appeals court eventually re-
viewing Ahmed’s case said that Ahmed’s blind imprisonment for 
groundless national security reasons was an injustice.  But that 
was before.  Before the “War on Terrorism.”
Today, in response to the horrific killing of thousands of Amer-
icans and people from countries around the world, the President, 
Congress and federal agencies, like the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, are creating a new regime of national security 
measures.  Some of these measures are needed and only reason-
ably burdensome—like added checks at airports and increased 
security at nuclear power plants and government buildings.  But 
others, like secret detentions, are immensely troubling.  When the 
government abuses its national security powers, particularly by 
targeting members of vulnerable groups, and is challenged, how 
are the U.S. courts likely to rule?
This is the key question for all concerned about both the na-
tion’s security and civil liberties, for all concerned about justice 
here as well as abroad.  Will the judiciary, as popularly believed, 
stand strong under the Constitution as the bulwark against ill-con-
ceived, harshly discriminatory government action during times of 
national stress?  Will it assure due process and equal protection 
for those denigrated in the public mind, the very democratic val-
ues that make the nation’s security worth protecting?  Or, taking 
an implicit cue from the U.S. Supreme Court, might frontline and 
appeals courts react with more fear than balance and replay in 
post-modern form the injustice of the Japanese American World 




preme Court Justice Jackson in the 1944 Korematsu case, which up-
held the legality of the internment:  “The Court has for all time 
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal pro-
cedure and of transplanting citizens.  The principle stands as a 
loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring 
forward a plausible claim of urgent need.”   
The “Law” after September 11
Two months after the deadly plane-bombings in New York and 
Washington D.C., the U.S. continues to detain over a thousand 
“suspected” terrorists.  Officials have not revealed the names or 
citizenship of hundreds of those arrested or their places of deten-
tion.  None has been charged with terrorist crimes.  Civil rights 
groups called for the release of information about these individu-
als, arguing that the secrecy surrounding these detentions “pre-
vents any democratic oversight of the government’s response to 
the attacks.”  In the face of charges that the government has been 
indefinitely jailing innocent people without charges, proper food 
or access to attorneys, U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft issued a 
Nixonian non-denial denial:  the government has engaged in no 
“wholesale abuse” of those detained.2 
In the wake of September 11, the government responded with 
a spate of laws designed both to address broad threats to the na-
tion’s physical security and to salve the nation’s damaged psyche. 
It did so by expanding executive and military powers to pursue 
what it described as a “war against terrorists”—increased wire-
tapping and surveillance, communications intercepts, secret prop-
erty searches, racial investigative profiling, prolonged detentions 
and accelerated deportations.  The government did this in part by 
curtailing rights of speech, press and association, as well rights 
to freedom from racial discrimination and incarceration without 
charges or trial.  In signing the far-reaching anti-terrorism “Pa-
triot” bill into law, President Bush vowed that the government 
would “enforce [it] with all the urgency of a nation at war.” 3 
Many among the American public responded with deep con-
cern both for those killed and for the proper balance of national 
security and civil liberties.  Others reacted by looking for scape-
goats.  Those remotely resembling persons of Arab ancestry were 
targeted.  In Arizona, a man angry about the bombings shot and 
killed a Sikh storeowner.  Men in a car shouting epithets ran over 
and killed a Native American woman.  Airline pilots, reacting to 











ans from flights for no other reason than their apparent ancestry. 
High school students in Dearborn, Michigan taunted a Muslim girl 
wearing a traditional headscarf, kicked her and slammed her into a 
locker.  In Los Angeles, two men mistook a Latino man for an Arab, 
followed him home and kicked in his front door.  In San Francisco, 
fake blood was smeared across the entrance to an Islamic commu-
nity center.  Businesses, homes and mosques were firebombed and 
vandalized.  Housing evictions, job firings, verbal harassment as 
well as assaults were reported in alarming numbers.
President Bush cautioned that the U.S. was targeting “terror-
ists,” not Muslims or all persons of Arab ancestry.  At the same 
time the government’s actions potentially raised the ugly specter 
of guilt-by-association (“if you’re not with us, you’re against us”). 
This principle, for some, was a coded reference to ancestry, casting 
suspicion on all persons of Arab descent.  Indeed the FBI and INS 
reportedly commenced racial profiling investigations and deten-
tions; the Justice Department appeared to resurrect support for the 
formerly discredited secret trials based on secret evidence for the 
deportation of “dangerous” immigrants—like Nasser Ahmed.  At-
torney General Ashcroft announced a “wartime reorganization” of 
the Justice Department to aggressively investigate and prosecute 
terrorists.  The government also launched a “terrorist tracking task 
force” to root out suspected terrorists who overstay their visas.  At-
torney General Ashcroft vowed to prosecute those suspected of as-
sociations with designated terrorist groups:  “If you overstay your 
visas even by one day, we will arrest you. . . .  If you violate a local 
law, we will hope that you will, and work to make sure that you are 
put in jail and be kept in custody as long as possible.”4   
Should we worry about the swashbuckling rhetoric of the 
head of the U.S. Justice Department?  Should we be concerned 
about the new expansive executive edicts, agency actions and 
Congressional enactments?  Don’t we have a Constitution that 
gives the government strong national security powers while 
protecting the civil liberties of all in America?  More specifically, 
aren’t the U.S. courts the bulwark against violations of the Bill of 
Rights?  The answers are that yes, we have explicit constitutional 
guarantees of due process and equal protection, but that no, the 
actual performance of our judiciary during times of national stress 
suggests that the courts will be influenced by popular politics and 
will subtly renounce their role as constitutional backstop; they 





We submit that this is how U.S. courts tend to perform during 
times of national distress—taking a hands-off approach in review-
ing government national security actions, even where fundamen-
tal liberties are sharply restricted.  As a consequence, the courts 
most often legitimize, rather than check, the actions of the execu-
tive and legislative branches reacting to the “ephemeral emotions 
of their political constituencies.”5   In times like these, we there-
fore must ask, as a democracy, how do we hold the executive and 
legislative branches accountable for military or national security 
actions inimical to the civil liberties of those in America, and who 
will insure that accountability?  Insights from the law of the Japa-
nese American internment help illuminate the complex dimen-
sions to these questions. 
Insights from Japanese American Internment: 
The Hands-off Role of the Courts
The politically popular and legally-sanctioned internment of 
120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II illustrates the 
dangers of political and racial scapegoating during national crisis. 
On February 19, 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Execu-
tive Order 9066, authorizing military commanders to protect West 
Coast military facilities.  Based on fear and racial stereotypes, the 
government then interned 120,000 Japanese Americans without 
charges, indictment or hearing.  The internees were forced to 
abandon their homes, farms and businesses with only what they 
could carry.  They lost their property, jobs and sense of security. 
They endured the desert heat, cold and dust storms in ten deso-
late camps surrounded by barbed wire and armed guards.6 
Three American citizens of Japanese ancestry challenged the 
internment as a violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection of laws.  In Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, the gov-
ernment countered by asserting that the danger of espionage and 
sabotage by persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast justi-
fied its extraordinary actions.  The government argued that “all 
Japanese, including American citizens, were, by culture and race, 
predisposed to loyalty to Japan and to disloyalty to the United 
States; that Japanese on the West Coast had committed and were 
likely to commit acts of espionage and sabotage against the United 
States; and that mass action was needed because there was insuf-
ficient time to determine disloyalty individually.”7   No evidence 
supported these assertions.











would subject the government’s discriminatory actions to the 
highest level of scrutiny.  “[D]istinctions between citizens solely 
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free 
people.”  “[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect.”
Despite its pronouncements, however, the Court deferred 
completely to the military’s unsubstantiated assertions of “ne-
cessity.”  It simply adopted the military’s sweeping conclusions 
about disloyal Japanese Americans.  The Court thus upheld the 
constitutionality of the internment (specifically, the curfew and ex-
clusion) and thereby sanctioned the government’s extraordinary 
civil liberties abuses.  Thousands of innocent Japanese Americans 
remained imprisoned on account of their race, later to carry into 
private life the legally sanctioned stigma of disloyalty.  
War Plus Racism Plus Law
Forty years passed before unearthed documents revealed that there 
had been no military necessity to justify the internment, that gov-
ernment decisionmakers knew this at the time and later lied about 
it to the Supreme Court.  In fact, the War and Justice Departments 
altered, destroyed and suppressed key exonerating evidence from 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and Federal Communications Commission.  In extraordinary coram 
nobis proceedings in the 1980s, the lower federal courts reversed 
course and acknowledged egregious government misconduct in 
justifying the internment and the resulting “manifest injustice” for 
all interned Japanese Americans.  In 1988, as the U.S. intensified 
its pro-democracy and human rights fight against communism, 
Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act.  The law provided $20,000 
reparations for each surviving internee, mandated a presidential 
apology and established a civil liberties public education fund.
Despite the coram nobis victories and the Civil Liberties Act, 
the original Korematsu case remains on the law books.  The Su-
preme Court “has not overruled or formally discredited the Kore-
matsu decision or its principle of judicial deference to government 
claims of military necessity.  Nor has the Court announced in 
principle that the demanding standards of review now normally 
applicable to government restrictions of constitutionally protect-
ed liberties are unaltered by the government’s claim of military 
necessity or national security.”  In fact, in a whole range of mod-
ern-day cases, courts have deferred to government assertions of 




Chief Justice Rehn-quist, ignoring the stark revelations of the Ko-
rematsu and Hirabayashi coram nobis cases, recently defended the 
internment as legally justified, at least as to first generation Japa-
nese Americans.  The Chief Justice also opined that the judiciary 
should defer to the executive branch and military during times of 
war, even in the face of harsh treatment of civilians in the U.S. on 
the basis of ancestry, even in the absence of martial law.9   
In the minds of many Americans the internment is an aber-
ration, a bad mistake during war.  Wartime exigencies gave rise 
to hasty actions.  The Supreme Court erred for this reason, not 
because of individual prejudices and the forces of popular senti-
ment.  In sharp contrast, and in light of the revelations of the co-
ram nobis cases, Professor Jerry Kang maintains that the important 
lesson of the internment is not just that wartime generates unfor-
tunate but inevitable mistakes—akin to the errant bombing of a 
Red Cross field hospital.  Instead, he posits, “wartime coupled 
with racism and intolerance create particular types of social mis-
takes”10 —like the politically popular incarceration of a group by 
reason of that group’s presumed disloyalty.  
We add another dimension to Professor Kang’s calculus:  na-
tional security crises coupled with racism or nativism and backed by 
the force of law generate deep and lasting social injustice.  Court rul-
ings, in particular, legitimize even extreme, albeit popular, govern-
mental actions—in the 1940s, the internment; yesterday, Ahmed’s 
three-year secret incarceration; today, potentially, groundless de-
tentions, secret trials and deportations and government racial pro-
filing and harassment.  Once legitimated by the courts, government 
excesses and human suffering take on the mantle of normalcy. 
Once broadly sanctioned by law, hostile or vengeful members of 
the public sense a license to harm.  It is the law’s stamp of approval 
on wartime exigencies plus racism that transforms mistakes of the 
moment into enduring social injustice.
What Now?: 
National Security, Civil Liberties and Democracy
No one doubts the broad powers of government to protect people 
and institutions.  The problem, history tells us, lies in harsh gov-
ernment excess in the exercise of that power.   
The most far-reaching recent government national security 
law is the hastily-enacted, 342-page “USA Patriot Act” (Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Re-











only six weeks after the attacks, the law authorizes expansive new 
powers for law enforcement agencies to wiretap phones, track In-
ternet traffic, conduct secret searches, examine private financial 
and educational records and prosecute anyone who supports a 
“terrorist.”  The law also allows the government to detain immi-
grants for seven days without charges and permits the possible 
indefinite detention of non-citizens without meaningful judicial 
review.11   
Because the law creates a new, broadly defined crime of “do-
mestic terrorism,” groups engaged in acts of political protest could 
be deemed terrorist organizations and their members criminally 
prosecuted as “terrorists.”  The American Civil Liberties Union 
warned that “Americans who oppose U.S. policies and who are 
believed to have ties to foreign powers could find their homes 
broken into and their telephones tapped.”  Those found provid-
ing assistance to designated terrorists could also be charged, even 
if the assistance is only providing food or shelter.  Small monetary 
contributions of humanitarian aid from the U.S., when adminis-
tered regionally by a group deemed to engage in terrorist activity, 
as in areas of Sri Lanka, make the donor a terrorist accomplice 
subject to prosecution.  Analysts warn that the Patriot Act will al-
low the government to intimidate people of color and immigrants 
on the basis of innuendo and conjecture. 12    
Even before the Act’s passage, government agents targeted 
Arab Americans and Muslims in the U.S.  Several colleges and 
universities were approached for information about foreign stu-
dents, students of particular ethnicities and students with strong 
political leanings.  FBI agents entered mosques, interrupted prayer 
services and harassed worshippers and awakened Arab Ameri-
cans late at night to interrogate them at length, even though they 
lacked any connection to terrorists.13  
Many Americans were also subjected to private attacks and 
discrimination because they remotely resembled Arabs or Mus-
lims.  Commercial airline pilots expelled from their planes Arab 
Americans, South Asians and others who “looked like terror-
ists”—the airline “has no choice but to reaccommodate a passen-
ger or passengers if their actions or presence make a majority of 
passengers uncomfortable and threaten to disrupt normal opera-
tions in flight.”
Hundreds were physically assaulted, harassed, fired or demot-
ed because of their ethnicity, religion or appearance.  Many others 




discriminated against in the schools.  Still others received hate mail, 
death threats and bomb threats.  Five people were killed.  The Jus-
tice Department commenced 170 investigations into hate crimes, 
including killings, shootings and arson.14 
What will happen when those profiled, detained, harassed or 
discriminated against turn to the courts for legal protection?  How 
will the U.S. courts respond to the need to protect fundamental 
democratic values of our political process—that people are to be 
treated fairly and equally?  No definitive answers emerge.  As the 
internment cases and more recent court rulings suggest, however, 
the judiciary most often yields to political pressure and declines 
to hold the government accountable for restrictions of civil liber-
ties during times of national stress.  Indeed, court observers warn 
that the same courts that frowned upon racial profiling in the past 
will authorize it “more definitively than before” to protect nation-
al security.15    
Korematsu Revisited:  The Call for Community 
Political Education and Mobilization
During World War II Fred Korematsu challenged the constitution-
ality of the internment and lost.  The Supreme Court blindly ac-
cepted the government’s false assertion of “military necessity.”  In 
the 1984 coram nobis case, federal judge Marilyn Hall Patel declared 
the original Korematsu case a “manifest injustice.”  In her ruling, 
Judge Patel echoed Justice Jackson’s “loaded weapon” warning for-
ty years earlier:  The Korematsu case debacle “stands as a constant 
caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our in-
stitutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. 
It stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military 
necessity and national security must not be used to protect govern-
mental actions from close scrutiny and accountability.  It stands as a 
caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms, our 
institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to 
exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears 
and prejudices that are so easily aroused.” 16   
Judge Patel thus exhorted “institutions” during national crisis 
to be vigilant in order to “protect all citizens from the petty fears 
and prejudices.”  Yet, institutions, particularly government, lean 
hard toward the powerful, not the powerless.  On their own they 
are disinclined to struggle to “protect all.”  Those institutions, in-
cluding the courts, however, are responsive in varying ways to 











Patel, but only when pushed to do so by the coordinated efforts 
of frontline community and political organizations, scholars, jour-
nalists and politicians.  The institutions will respond, but only to 
up-front education, in-your-face organizing and strategic political 
mobilization.
The real bulwark against governmental excess and lax judicial 
scrutiny, then, is political education and mobilization, both at the 
front end when laws are passed and enforced and at the back end 
when they are challenged in courts.  During World War II intern-
ment, at the front end, no one spoke against it.  Not the ACLU, not 
the NAACP.  Not even the Japanese American Citizens League. 
All were silent, feeling vulnerable and fearing the repercussions 
of appearing to be unpatriotic.  And the internment proceeded 
apace, and the high court legitimated it.  Forty years later, at the 
back end challenge to the injustice, the Korematsu coram nobis legal 
team took a different tack.  It engaged a multifaceted legal-po-
litical strategy—litigation, community organizing, public educa-
tion, media storytell-ing and scholarly writing.  Civil rights and 
community groups and concerned individuals joined the struggle 
in the courts, Congress and President’s office, as well as in the 
schools, churches, union halls and community centers.  The legal 
process provided a focal point for these efforts, but political edu-
cation and mobilization shaped the larger public understandings 
crucial to the success of the internment justice movement.
In today’s climate of fear and anger, our first task in protect-
ing both people and key democratic values is to be pro-active at 
the front end—to prevent post-modern forms of internment.  We 
need to organize and speak out to assure that the expansive new 
national security regime does not overwhelm the civil liberties of 
vulnerable groups and move the country toward a police state.  We 
need to mobilize and raise challenges to prevent Ahmed-like secret 
incarcerations, particularly en masse.  Through political analysis, 
education and activism, our job is to compel powerful institutions, 
particularly the courts, to be vigilant, to “protect all.”  Our second 
task is to be assertive at the back end—to call out injustice when it 
occurs, to spell out the damage it does to real people in our midst 
and to our constitutional democracy, and to demand accountability 
to principles of equality and due process.
Our collective task, then, is to turn Justice Jackson’s warning 
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